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total immobilization until death, both physical and 
mental.
The logic of this scheme is impeccable but left 
its early followers with a problem. It has as conse-
quence that a liberated person is a dead person, 
implying that there can be no liberated teacher of 
the Jain path because attaining enlightenment or 
omniscience would be virtually simultaneous with 
death and liberation. Even Mahāvīra, the most 
recent Tīrthaṅkara, was by this logic no enlightened 
person, nor were any of the earlier Tīrthaṅkaras.
To my knowledge, there is no explicit discussion 
of this issue that goes back to the earliest time. How-
ever, we do find that Jainism developed an elaborate 
theoretical structure around the notion of karmic 
retribution that did provide an answer to this ques-
tion. This new structure finds its earliest expression 
in certain texts of the Śvetāmbara canon – begin-
ning, perhaps, with the Vyākhyāprajñapti Sūtra – 
and is subsequently systematized in the Tattvārtha 
Sūtra and other texts. Also the Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama, 
one of the texts that the Digambaras look on as 
canonical, deals with the new vision of karman, as 
do many more recent works. In all of them, karman 
is presented as a form of matter that clings to the 
soul (jīva) and that is responsible for the soul’s being 
caught up in saṃsāra. We will see below what place 
this new understanding of karman reserves for liber-
ated persons.
S. Ohira5 has drawn attention to the fact that 
the material conception of karman could not have 
arisen until other developments, most notably an 
atomic theory associated with the term pudgala 
(which came to designate matter), had come into 
being. What is more, the notion of karman as a sub-
stance that clings to the soul only makes sense once 
the classical Jain idea of a soul that is coextensive 
with the body (śarīra) has been accepted. These 
notions (pudgala, body-sized soul) entered Jainism 
under the influence of Abhidharma Buddhism.6 
The particular kind of Abhidharma that exerted 
It is beyond doubt that Jainism incorporated a belief 
in rebirth and karmic retribution from the begin-
ning. What is more, it seems safe to claim that Jain-
ism, right from the beginning, presented itself as a 
way to escape from the cycle of rebirths (saṃsāra) 
and karmic retribution. Judging by the practices that 
we find prescribed already in our earliest sources, 
karmic retribution and the proposed liberation 
(mokṣa) from it were envisaged in the following 
manner.
Jainism’s path to liberation culminates in the total 
immobilization of body and mind. Indeed, this final 
immobilization ends in the physical death of the 
aspirant for liberation, and in his (or also her, accord-
ing to some) liberation from rebirth and karmic ret-
ribution. This makes sense on the assumption that 
all activity has consequences in future lives. Only 
thus is the cessation of all activity a necessary con-
dition for liberation from karmic retribution. Early 
Buddhist literature confirms that in Jainism all activ-
ity has karmic consequences, and a detailed study of 
the earliest texts of the Śvetāmbara canon – includ-
ing the Ācārāṅga Sūtra and the Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra – 
confirms that passions and the like are to be avoided 
for no other reason than that they lead to activity.1
There is little more regarding karmic retribution 
that we can safely attribute to the earliest Jainism: all 
activity leads to karmic retribution, which is always 
depicted negatively. The texts “never promise an aus-
picious next birth to the person leading a good life.”2 
This explains no doubt why, still in more recent days, 
stories about earlier lives of the Jina, fewer in number 
than those concerning the Buddha in Buddhism, do 
not, unlike their Buddhist counterparts, emphasize 
the good deeds that allowed these earlier incarna-
tions to reach this highest state;3 this is in spite of the 
fact that some late and post-canonical texts know 
a kind of karman – called tīrthaṅkaranāmakarman 
(name karman of a Tīrthaṅkara) – that accumulates 
in future Tīrthaṅkaras.4 The only way to avoid the 
negative consequences of one’s activity is through 
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this influence arose in northwest India, in the 
2nd century BCE at the earliest.7 It is possible, but 
not certain, that the new understanding of karman 
came about at the time when many other aspects of 
Jainism underwent a major overhaul (including the 
abandonment of relic and stūpa worship), presum-
ably under the Kushanas during the early centuries 
of the Common Era.
What did the new karman doctrine look like?8 
The earliest Jainism linked karmic retribution to all 
activity whatsoever, not only to moral and immoral 
activity. Only thus did it make sense to look for a way 
out through total bodily and mental immobiliza-
tion. In the form of Jainism that subsequently arose, 
activity carries the name yoga. The activity (yoga) 
of the soul is responsible for the influx (āsrava) of 
karmic matter, more precisely perhaps, the influx of 
matter that then becomes karmic matter of various 
kinds. In this respect, scholastic Jainism builds on 
and develops its old tradition. However, a new ele-
ment is added: karmic matter clings to the soul as 
a result of passion (kaṣāya). This element, passion, 
introduces a psychological dimension that was, as 
far as we can tell, missing as a causal factor in the 
earliest Jainism. If it is indeed a new dimension, it 
is not difficult to guess where it came from. A preoc-
cupation with psychological processes had charac-
terized Buddhism from its beginning. It was under 
the influence of Buddhism that Jainism underwent 
major changes. It makes sense to assume that it was 
also under the influence of Buddhism that Jainism 
introduced the psychological dimension respon-
sible for entities like passion.
The Jain path to liberation now becomes a path 
of purification.9 The soul has to be purified of the 
karman that clings to it. As it so happens, karmic 
matter falls into two general categories, depend-
ing on whether the person concerned has passions 
(kaṣāya) or not: karman relating to future lives 
(sāmparāyika) and karman relating to the path of 
asceticism (īryāpatha).10 In the former case, the 
influx of karman causes rebirth; in the latter, the 
influx of karman is of short duration (it does not 
cling) and does not cause rebirth. It will be clear 
that in this way the system has a place for people 
who act in the world without having to pay for it in 
a future rebirth. In other words, there is now place 
for Tīrthaṅkaras and kevalins. Strictly speaking, they 
are enlightened but not yet liberated. P. Dundas 
describes the situation as follows:
Spiritual deliverance (mokṣa) is defined in sim-
ple terms by Umāsvāti (TS 10.5) as release from 
all karma. This should in its finality be clearly 
distinguished from the attainment of enlight-
enment which, after the cultivation of morally 
positive attitudes, the practice of austerity and 
the gradual suppression of negative discrimina-
tive mental processes, involves the uprooting of 
deluding karma which is then succeeded by the 
removal of the remaining three harming karmas, 
thus liberating the innate qualities, such as omni-
science, of the jīva. Enlightenment, however, does 
not of itself entail death, for the operation of the 
four non-harming karmas is still unimpaired, with 
life and name karma guaranteeing the continua-
tion of embodied existence and experience karma 
ensuring bodily sensations, although the latter 
point was a source of sectarian dispute for the 
Digambaras who denied that a kevalin’s feeling 
karma could bring about an effect such as hun-
ger. The enlightened person, whether fordmaker 
or kevalin, may therefore spend a considerable 
period after enlightenment engaging in mental 
and physical activities such as walking, preaching 
and meditation. However, no new karma is bound 
by these activities nor is it possible in this state 
to carry out acts of violence, even involuntarily.11
There is a condition to reaching enlightenment: 
Tīrthaṅkaras and kevalins have to be without pas-
sions (kaṣāya). How is that to be accomplished? 
Clearly, the path to liberation now passes through 
the suppression of kaṣāya. Unfortunately, it appears 
that the Jain scholiasts had some difficulty cat-
egorizing kaṣāya in their scheme of things. This 
is confirmed by looking at the Tattvārtha Sūtra, a 
text whose “greatest achievement…lies in its sys-
tematization of the philosophical contents of the 
Jaina canon…and in its innovation of certain tra-
ditional concepts as well as the formulation of cer-
tain new concepts.”12 The Tattvārtha Sūtra includes 
the kaṣāya (of which it distinguishes four subtypes 
[see below]) in the wider category of “right-conduct 
deluding karmas” (cāritramohanīya).13 This means 
that kaṣāya itself has become a form of karman, 
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thus turning the explanation of the influx of rebirth-
producing karman into a circular affair: karman is 
responsible for the fact that karman clings to the 
soul. R.J. Zydenbos14 calls kaṣāya “a kind of ‘master- 
karma’ through which other kinds of karma are 
bound.”
Whatever the precise method to be used, once 
a person has succeeded in eliminating kaṣāya and 
with it the various forms of karman relating to future 
lives (sāmparāyika), he or she can still engage in 
activity (yoga), but this will only lead to the influx 
(āsrava) of karman relating to the path of asceticism 
(īryāpatha), which will disappear again after a very 
short time. Those who do not succeed in eliminat-
ing kaṣāya will be reborn as a result of the karman 
that remains. It is here to be noted that the karmic 
particles that attach to nonliberated souls form the 
karmic body (kārmaṇaśarīra), which along with the 
luminous body (taijasaśarīra) accompanies the soul 
from one birth to the next.15 This assures that none 
of the karmic burden is lost during transmigration.
It should be clear from the above that the posi-
tion adopted by Jain scholiasts crucially accepted 
the idea that the soul can act, that it can have activity 
(yoga), but not all activity has karmic consequences. 
In its most generally accepted version, at least from 
the Tattvārtha Sūtra onward, only activity accompa-
nied by passion (kaṣāya) had such effects. However, 
this was not the only possible version, and a highly 
respected thinker of uncertain date, Kundakunda, 
proposed a different one. I will concentrate on his 
Samayasāra, a work that “has greatly influenced 
Digambara thinking for centuries, and has been 
acclaimed by them as the most profound exposition 
of the Jaina doctrine.”16
Kundakunda draws inspiration from the 
Brahmanical Sāṃkhya philosophy. This philosophy 
introduces a distinction between two altogether dif-
ferent realms: the self (puruṣa) and nature (prakṛti). 
The self is completely inactive, and all activity takes 
place in the realm of nature. Sāṃkhya teaches that 
the way to liberation passes through the realization 
that one’s inner self is altogether different from all 
that acts.
Kundakunda disagrees in claiming that the 
soul, unlike the self of Sāṃkhya, can and does act. 
However, he agrees with Sāṃkhya in thinking that 
liberation depends on the realization that the soul 
is altogether different from acts that have karmic 
consequences. The soul is active in that it produces 
bhāvas, “states” such as anger (krodha), as a result of 
which karmic matter may cling to the soul. From a 
practical, and therefore lower, point of view, the soul 
is the agent of material karman, but from the highest 
point of view, it is the agent of the bhāvas only, not of 
material karman. Only metaphorically can one say 
that karman has been produced by the soul.
The following verses from the Samayasāra illus-
trate these points:
If the soul did not undergo modifications under 
the influence of bhāvas such as anger,
there would be no cycle of rebirths (saṃsāra) or 
the Sāṃkhya philosophy would be correct.17
The soul makes a bhāva and is its agent from the 
highest point of view,
while from a practical (and therefore lower) point 
of view, it is the agent of material karman.18
The soul is an agent by its own bhāva,
but it is not the agent of all the bhāvas produced 
by material karman.19
Just as the self makes its own bhāva (ātmanaḥ 
bhāvam) because of material karman,
so it experiences its own bhāva because of mate-
rial karman.20
Kundakunda’s crucial point is that not all bhāvas 
result in karmic matter clinging to the soul. Some 
bhāvas do no such thing. If the soul engages only in 
activities that produce such harmless bhāvas, then 
there will be no further influx of karman.
The picture is somewhat complicated by the fact 
that in Kundakunda’s opinion, there are two kinds 
of bhāvas: those that belong to and are (part of) the 
soul and those that belong to karman. Kundakunda’s 
main argument turns around bhāvas that are part 
of the soul. These are the bhāvas that the soul pro-
duces, and it is by producing harmless bhāvas from 
among these that the soul can reach liberation.
A comparison of Kundakunda’s understand-
ing with the classical picture depicted above 
shows a number of similarities along with certain 
14 1983, 15.
15 Jaini, 1980, 132.
16 Jaini, 2000, 30; 2001, 92; for an analysis of Kundakunda’s 
thought, see Bronkhorst, 2016c.
17 SS. 127; trans. by author.
18 SS. 24; trans. by author.
19 SS. 88; trans. by author.
20 SS. 93; trans. by author.
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differences. Kundakunda’s bhāvas specified as anger 
and so on correspond to kaṣāya in the Tattvārtha 
Sūtra and elsewhere. Indeed, kaṣāya is there said to 
cover anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceit (māyā), 
and greed (lobha). There is, however, a major differ-
ence. Kaṣāya, on the one hand, is ultimately a form of 
karman; Kundakunda’s bhāvas (or at least the rel-
evant ones), on the other hand, are part of the 
soul. What is more, in Kundakunda’s scheme, the 
soul must acquire an insight into the highest point 
of view, according to which it is never the agent of 
material karman. From the highest standpoint, the 
self makes nothing but itself and experiences itself. It 
is through ignorance that the soul thinks it becomes 
the agent of the karmans; in reality, it is not.
With this insight, the soul can see which is the 
road leading to liberation. By concentrating on only 
those states (bhāvas) that have no karmic conse-
quences, karman will no longer cling to it, and puri-
fication of the soul can be accomplished.
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